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Key Points:
•

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has problems attracting technically savvy
recruits, owing to competition from China’s booming economy.

•

The PLA feels the United States will intervene in a conflict over Taiwan, and is training
to defend against or defeat the U.S. military.

•

Japan and the Korean Peninsula could become issues as troublesome for the PLA as Taiwan.

•

China and the PLA are becoming more active in South and Southeast Asia to increase
China’s influence in the region.  India’s rise, in particular, concerns China.

Over 50 experts on China and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gathered at Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, from September 23-25, to attend the 2005 PLA Conference, “The PLA Shapes
the Future Security Environment,” cosponsored by the Heritage Foundation and the U.S. Army War
College.  The colloquium considered how the PLA shapes the global security environment.
Discussion began with the changing relationship between the PLA and the Chinese people, and its
effect on PLA recruiting efforts.  While officially the PLA is “the Army of the People,” the Army may
not be as close to the people as it believes.
Because of China’s strong, growing economy, the PLA is concerned with its ability to attract the
high-tech recruits it increasingly needs.  The PLA’s General Staff Department and the General Political
Department have developed competing approaches to attracting such recruits.  The General Political
Department hopes to recruit those already best qualified to serve in the ever-modernizing PLA.  The
General Staff Department, however, is working on a comprehensive military education system to
transform any recruits into high-quality personnel.
China’s changing population base has affected the PLA.  As China becomes more modern, fewer
Han Chinese from affluent coastal areas are willing to join the Army, and it will have to look increasingly
to “upriver” (i.e., inland provinces) Chinese and ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs and Mongolians,
to meet recruiting goals.  The PLA is also hiring civilians to fill certain roles.  Interviews with Chinese
students show that those who intend to join the PLA do so because it is the “family business” (i.e., their

family has a history of military service). They
also say that PLA recruiters raise three themes:
Chinese nationalism, the PLA will give them a
place to develop marketable skills, and service
provides a stable lifestyle.
The PLA knows it needs to change to keep
up with a modernizing China.   However, the
differences in approach between the General Staff
Department and the General Political Department
highlight that the PLA is still trying to decide how
best to do so.
The conference next considered how the PLA
assesses the Taiwan situation.  The PLA considers
itself an army of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and the people.  Since the CCP purportedly
represents the interests of all the people, a threat
against the CCP is technically also a threat against
the nation.  
A dichotomy of opinion exists between
the PLA and the CCP over Taiwan.   The prior
concept of “peaceful reunification with Taiwan”
was a placeholder for the PLA, as it could not
defeat the Taiwanese militarily.   This kept PLA
budgets low.  But that changed in 1996 with the
Taiwan missile crisis, when the CCP leadership
believed party-characterized “separatist trends”
in Taiwan threatened China’s core interests, and
that provided impetus to the party hawks.  
The PLA has most often fought defensively,
and so has a “bunker mentality,” causing the
army to view its actions as defending itself against
exterior threats.  It over-prepares militarily, while
not understanding how these actions could
appear belligerent to outsiders.
The PLA and the CCP agree that the PLA’s
job is to maintain Chinese sovereignty; that the
Taiwan issue is key to China’s future success as a
world power; and that the island should be taken
without violence, if possible.   Within the PLA,
there are two factions—those who feel that the
Army would eventually win; and those younger
officers who are more cautious and advocate a
Chinese “Revolution in Military Affairs” and
asymmetric warfare.  The PLA believes the United
States will react to an invasion of Taiwan, and it
is not ready to face an American intervention.  
President Hu Jintao stated the CCP’s position on

Taiwan—“Striving for negotiations, preparing
for war, not fearing delays.”
The next panel considered PLA assessments
of the U.S. military. The PLA views the United
States as its biggest potential threat, and is training
to defeat the U.S. military.  The PLA believes the
Chinese mainland will receive long-range strikes
from U.S. precision-guided munitions. Chinese
militia training focuses on urban air defense
and infrastructure repair. On paper, the PLA
understands the complexity of modern warfare.  
“Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese
Characteristics” is the PLA’s version of the U.S.
term; it is concerned with upgrading logistics and
equipment.  The PLA slogan, “three attacks and
three defenses,” is geared towards stealth aircraft,
cruise missiles, and helicopter gunships—all U.S.
capabilities.
The PLA has increased the size, number,
communications and firepower of its air defense
units.  It also has increased the use of obscurants,
UAVs, and combined arms training, and has a
growing professional NCO corps.  However, the
training is rudimentary and, in fact, may not be
effective.  Overall,  continued emphasis on armor
and mechanized forces and the dearth of close
air support, helicopters, and air cushion vehicles
calls the PLA’s capabilities into question.
The PLA’s assessment of the U.S. military at
war was discussed.  At the beginning of the War
in Iraq, the campaign of “shock and awe” and
the use of targeted “decapitation strikes” against
Iraqi leaders and communications amazed PLA
officials.   They used the opportunity to analyze
the U.S. forces’ strengths and weaknesses, as well
as mistakes made by the Iraqi military.   Many
articles on these issues appeared in Chinese
military journals, but surprisingly few linked
“People’s War” and insurgency.   China and the
PLA have used the U.S. involvement in Iraq
to strengthen their ties with the Third World,
particularly Central Asia.  
The conferees then discussed the PLA and its
activities in Northeast Asia. The Sino-Japanese
relationship is deteriorating at the same time
that U.S.-Japanese relations are improving.
The presenter posited that the PLA is a drag on
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Sino-Japanese relations, adding friction—the
sources of which include events in World War II,
competition for oil resources, nationalism on both
sides, and recent anti-Japanese riots in China.
Both China and Japan have experienced
numerous political and economic changes since
normalization of relations in 1970.   However,
interdependent economic interests, the focus in
both countries on domestic issues, and the fact that
few governments would benefit from increased
Sino-Japanese rivalry argue against serious
problems, although friction will continue.
The attendees questioned the PLA’s role in
Sino-Japanese relations.   The PLA seems more
concerned with sovereignty and oil supply.  Oil
claims in disputed territories are expected to
become a source of trouble, but won’t happen
until one country tries to develop those resources.  
Ultimately, the Sino-Japanese relationship may be
a bigger problem than the Taiwan issue.
On the colloquium’s final morning, conferees
discussed the PLA’s activities in South Asia.  The
PLA sees India as a potential rival power in the
region, and, therefore it is trying to become more
active there.  Border issues, the nuclearization of
South Asia, the rise of India in the region, and
closer U.S./Indian military ties are also concerns.  
The PLA has been increasing its ties with Pakistan
and Bangladesh through military exchanges and
exercises, while not doing so with India.
Next the focus was on China and Southeast
Asia.  The PLA has not been a major actor there,
but functions as a “big stick” behind China’s
political statements.   The current major issue of
Southeast Asian countries is security, and China
has been very active diplomatically in the region.  
The PLA has only mattered during involvement
concerning the Spratleys and Paracel Islands,
but it has been active in arms sales and joint
production of weapons with various Southeast
Asian countries.  Coupled with security assistance,
this has been the PLA’s major role in the region in
recent times.
Chinese political scientists have advanced the
theory of China’s “Peaceful Rise”—that it can
become a superpower in a way that will not lead
to war. The Chinese see their rise as a world power

as inevitable, and place the onus on the United
States not to create tensions by interfering.  There
is an implied sting in the theory that seems to say
“we won’t threaten you, but stay out of our way.”  
As an extension of this concept, Chinese political
scientists have created a literal “calculus” (with
mathematical formulas) that determines a nation’s
comprehensive national power.   The danger is
that this plays to China’s victim mentality. Slow
progress in modernization or economic growth
could be considered evidence of “meddling” by
other countries.
The closing discussion raised the possibility
that China’s military buildup has a broader
purpose than potential conflict with Taiwan—the
military underpinning to China’s rise to a regional,
and super, power.  The turning point came in the
early 1990s as China’s economy began to surge,
the Gulf War showed U.S. military strengths,
and advanced weaponry from the crumbling
Soviet Union became available.  Since 1996, China
has been preparing the PLA to prevent Taiwan
secession.   The “holy grail” for China would be
to take Taiwan before the United States could
intervene.   The lesser preferred outcome would
be to prevent the United States from entering the
Taiwan theater.  This is the PLA’s ultimate aim,
but not its only goal.
What would happen if both China and
Taiwan reached a status quo?  The PLA buildup
would continue, since, as a rising regional and
world power, China feels it has a right to a strong
military.  Chinese economic slowdown or the prodevelopment policies of Hu Jintao might reduce
military budgets but would only change the pace
of modernization, not stop it.
Participants suggested that perhaps it is in the
PLA’s interest to keep the Taiwan situation in a
state of status quo, as it justifies a large military
budget without the risk of combat.  Also, regional
preeminence is perhaps a lesser concern to the
Chinese than internal stability, improving the
economy, and nationalist issues.
China may feel threatened by U.S. military
contacts with Russia, India, and Japan, but the
United States would have to disengage from
major powers in the region just to soothe China’s
feelings.
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At the close of the colloquium, the
participants discussed several issues for further
consideration.   What is China’s perception of
the United States and its military?  What is the
U.S. perception of China’s intent in Asia and
the world?  And while U.S. foreign and military
policies are openly and transparently debated;
in China, these policies are not.
*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

4

